Deploy Moltbot to Fly.io
[](https://agentverus.ai/skill/facba33b-7b5f-420c-9b7f-ee36d17db449)Community Comments
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Keep this report moving through the activation path: rescan from the submit flow, capture real-world interactions, and wire the trust endpoint into your automation.
https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/facba33b-7b5f-420c-9b7f-ee36d17db449/trustUse your saved key to act on this report immediately instead of returning to onboarding.
Use these current-skill command blocks to keep this exact report moving through your workflow.
curl -X POST https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/interactions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer at_your_api_key" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agentPlatform":"openclaw","skillId":"facba33b-7b5f-420c-9b7f-ee36d17db449","interactedAt":"2026-03-15T12:00:00Z","outcome":"success"}'curl https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/facba33b-7b5f-420c-9b7f-ee36d17db449/trustCategory Scores
Findings (14)
Found command-substitution remote execution pattern: "`curl -L https://fly.io/install.sh | sh`"
→ Remove command-substitution remote execution ($(curl http://…), `wget …`). Fetching and executing remote content as a command is remote code execution and a supply-chain compromise vector.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The skill relies on third-party AI providers or APIs, expanding the remote dependency surface for prompts, inputs, or generated artifacts.
→ Review which external services or providers the skill depends on, what data crosses that boundary, and whether the dependency is necessary for the intended workflow.
The skill performs or enables higher-risk operations but does not define explicit safety boundaries describing what it must not do.
→ Add a 'Safety Boundaries' section listing what the skill must NOT do (e.g., no file deletion, no network access beyond needed APIs).
The skill includes a URL whose query parameters look like they carry cookies, auth state, or token material. URLs are commonly logged and replayed, so credential-bearing parameters expand the dependency risk surface even on first-party domains. Related auth/profile context: - overlapping signals from the same local context — Unknown external reference
→ Avoid query-string credential transport. Prefer secure headers, dedicated cookie APIs, or other mechanisms that do not expose bearer material in URLs.
Found credential vault enrollment pattern: "auth login" Related auth/profile context: - auth/session capability-contract context — Capability contract mismatch: inferred cookie URL handoff is not declared
→ Treat credential-vault setup and stored-login workflows as sensitive credential handling. Be explicit about what secrets enter the vault, where they are stored, and how they are protected or revoked.
Found temporary script execution pattern: "node -e"
→ Treat ad hoc script generation and immediate execution as privileged code execution. Review generated scripts before running them and avoid opaque wrapper commands where possible.
Found external ai provider delegation pattern: "OpenAI API"
→ Treat external AI-provider calls as data egress. Make it explicit what prompts, files, or images are sent to third-party providers and require approval before forwarding sensitive content.
The skill references a well-known installer script in its setup instructions.
→ Consider documenting the exact version or hash of the installer for supply chain verification.
Found state persistence pattern: "persistent storage"
→ If state persistence is needed, document what data is stored and where. Allow users to review stored data.
The skill contains a curl-pipe-to-shell pattern in its setup/prerequisites section.
→ Consider pinning the installer to a specific version or hash for supply chain verification.
The skill lacks a meaningful description, making it difficult to assess its purpose.
→ Add a clear, detailed description of what the skill does and what it needs access to.