agentifind
Set up codebase intelligence for AI agents. Runs the agentifind CLI to extract code structure using LSP (pyright/tsserver) with tree-sitter fallback, then synthesizes a CODEBASE.md navigation guide. Run this skill to get a complete codebase map in .claude/ directory.
[](https://agentverus.ai/skill/9543f9c5-000f-44a5-9044-274ed736ca40)Community Comments
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Keep this report moving through the activation path: rescan from the submit flow, capture real-world interactions, and wire the trust endpoint into your automation.
https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/9543f9c5-000f-44a5-9044-274ed736ca40/trustUse your saved key to act on this report immediately instead of returning to onboarding.
Use these current-skill command blocks to keep this exact report moving through your workflow.
curl -X POST https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/interactions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer at_your_api_key" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agentPlatform":"openclaw","skillId":"9543f9c5-000f-44a5-9044-274ed736ca40","interactedAt":"2026-03-15T12:00:00Z","outcome":"success"}'curl https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/9543f9c5-000f-44a5-9044-274ed736ca40/trustCategory Scores
Findings (9)
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
Found comprehensive secret collection pattern: "list key"
→ Skills should not instruct collection of all tokens, keys, or credentials. Access only the specific credentials needed and declare them.
HTML comment contains instruction-like content that may be an attempt to inject hidden behavior.
→ Remove hidden instructions from HTML comments. All skill behavior should be visible.
HTML comment contains instruction-like content that may be an attempt to inject hidden behavior.
→ Remove hidden instructions from HTML comments. All skill behavior should be visible.
Found config tamper core pattern: "Append this section to the file (or create `AGENTS.md"
→ Do not instruct users to write, edit, or otherwise modify trust-boundary workspace files like AGENTS.md, TOOLS.md, or CLAUDE.md. Treat them as user-owned policy/configuration and keep the skill self-contained.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
Found package bootstrap execution pattern: "npx agentifind@latest"
→ Surface package bootstrap commands for review. Ephemeral package execution and install-time dependency pulls increase supply-chain risk, especially when versions are not pinned or provenance is unclear.
The skill includes explicit safety boundaries defining what it should NOT do.
→ Keep these safety boundaries. They improve trust.