moltbot-security
Security hardening for AI agents - Moltbot, OpenClaw, Cursor, Claude. Lock down gateway, fix permissions, auth, firewalls. Essential for vibe-coding setups.
[](https://agentverus.ai/skill/5d028cce-102f-4813-9935-8f69fbe8613e)Community Comments
Public comments are the active feedback surface on skill reports right now. Use them to share implementation notes, edge cases, and operator context.
Sign in to comment on this skill
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts.
Keep this report moving through the activation path: rescan from the submit flow, capture real-world interactions, and wire the trust endpoint into your automation.
https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/5d028cce-102f-4813-9935-8f69fbe8613e/trustUse your saved key to act on this report immediately instead of returning to onboarding.
Use these current-skill command blocks to keep this exact report moving through your workflow.
curl -X POST https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/interactions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer at_your_api_key" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agentPlatform":"openclaw","skillId":"5d028cce-102f-4813-9935-8f69fbe8613e","interactedAt":"2026-03-15T12:00:00Z","outcome":"success"}'curl https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/5d028cce-102f-4813-9935-8f69fbe8613e/trustCategory Scores
Findings (22)
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The skill relies on third-party AI providers or APIs, expanding the remote dependency surface for prompts, inputs, or generated artifacts.
→ Review which external services or providers the skill depends on, what data crosses that boundary, and whether the dependency is necessary for the intended workflow.
Found system modification pattern: "sudo apt install"
→ Skills should not modify system configuration or install packages globally. Bundle required dependencies.
Found system modification pattern: "systemctl restart"
→ Skills should not modify system configuration or install packages globally. Bundle required dependencies.
Found system modification pattern: "UFW"
→ Skills should not modify system configuration or install packages globally. Bundle required dependencies.
Found system modification pattern: "~/.zshrc"
→ Skills should not modify system configuration or install packages globally. Bundle required dependencies.
The skill performs or enables higher-risk operations but does not define explicit safety boundaries describing what it must not do.
→ Add a 'Safety Boundaries' section listing what the skill must NOT do (e.g., no file deletion, no network access beyond needed APIs).
The skill references 6 external URLs and also discusses auth/API/payment workflows, which increases the chance that sensitive operations depend on many remote endpoints.
→ Minimize external dependencies to reduce supply chain risk.
Found unrestricted scope pattern: "full system access"
→ Define clear boundaries for what the skill can and cannot do. Unrestricted scope is a security risk.
Found external ai provider delegation pattern: "OpenAI, and other providers"
→ Treat external AI-provider calls as data egress. Make it explicit what prompts, files, or images are sent to third-party providers and require approval before forwarding sensitive content.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
Piping a downloaded script directly to a shell interpreter. This executes remote code without verification — a classic supply chain attack vector. (Well-known installer domain — reduced severity.)
→ Review the code block starting at line 196. This uses a well-known installer — consider pinning to a specific version or hash.
Found federated auth flow pattern: "OAuth"
→ Treat OAuth, 2FA, and token-refresh guidance as authentication-sensitive workflows. Explain scope, storage, and refresh behavior clearly so agents do not handle more credential material than necessary.
The skill references an unknown external domain which is classified as low risk.
→ Verify that this external dependency is trustworthy and necessary.
The skill references an unknown external domain which is classified as low risk.
→ Verify that this external dependency is trustworthy and necessary.
The skill references an unknown external domain which is classified as low risk.
→ Verify that this external dependency is trustworthy and necessary.
The skill references a well-known installer script in its setup instructions.
→ Consider documenting the exact version or hash of the installer for supply chain verification.
Found state persistence pattern: "write file"
→ If state persistence is needed, document what data is stored and where. Allow users to review stored data.
The skill references a well-known installer script.
→ Consider pinning the installer to a specific version or hash for supply chain verification.