AgentOS SDK for Clawdbot
**Version:** 1.4.4 The complete AgentOS integration for Clawdbot. One install, full access to everything. ---
[](https://agentverus.ai/skill/3fc36491-c396-4543-9883-4e0dbede48d0)Community Comments
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Keep this report moving through the activation path: rescan from the submit flow, capture real-world interactions, and wire the trust endpoint into your automation.
https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/3fc36491-c396-4543-9883-4e0dbede48d0/trustUse your saved key to act on this report immediately instead of returning to onboarding.
Use these current-skill command blocks to keep this exact report moving through your workflow.
curl -X POST https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/interactions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer at_your_api_key" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agentPlatform":"openclaw","skillId":"3fc36491-c396-4543-9883-4e0dbede48d0","interactedAt":"2026-03-15T12:00:00Z","outcome":"success"}'curl https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/3fc36491-c396-4543-9883-4e0dbede48d0/trustCategory Scores
Findings (11)
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The skill references a direct IP address which is classified as high risk.
→ Replace direct IP addresses with proper domain names. IP-based URLs bypass DNS-based security controls.
Found config tamper core pattern: "Add to Your AGENTS.md"
→ Do not instruct users to write, edit, or otherwise modify trust-boundary workspace files like AGENTS.md, TOOLS.md, or CLAUDE.md. Treat them as user-owned policy/configuration and keep the skill self-contained.
Found unrestricted scope pattern: "full access"
→ Define clear boundaries for what the skill can and cannot do. Unrestricted scope is a security risk.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The skill references 4 external URLs and also discusses auth/API/payment workflows, which increases the chance that sensitive operations depend on many remote endpoints.
→ Minimize external dependencies to reduce supply chain risk.
Found persistent session reuse pattern: "background daemon"
→ Call out when browser or auth state persists across commands. Reused authenticated sessions should require explicit user consent and clear cleanup guidance.
Found federated auth flow pattern: "OAuth"
→ Treat OAuth, 2FA, and token-refresh guidance as authentication-sensitive workflows. Explain scope, storage, and refresh behavior clearly so agents do not handle more credential material than necessary.
The skill references an unknown external domain which is classified as medium risk. Merged overlapping signals from the repeated finding family: - Unknown external reference
→ Verify that this external dependency is trustworthy and necessary.
The skill does not include explicit safety boundaries defining what it should NOT do.
→ Add a 'Safety Boundaries' section listing what the skill must NOT do (e.g., no file deletion, no network access beyond needed APIs).